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Abstract
This paper offers a framework to study commitment and cooperation issues in
games with multiple policymakers. To reconcile some puzzles in the recent literature
on the nature of policy interactions among nations, we prove that games characterized
by different commitment and cooperation schemes can admit the same equilibrium
outcome if certain spillover effects vanish at the common solution of these games. We
provide a detailed discussion of these spillovers, showing that, in general, commitment
and cooperation are non-trivial issues. Yet, in linear-quadratic models with multiple
policymakers commitment and cooperation schemes are shown to become irrelevant
under certain assumptions. The framework is sufficiently general to cover a broad
range of results from the recent literature on policy interactions as special cases, both
within monetary unions and among fully sovereign nations.
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1 Introduction
The literature on the nature of policy interactions among nations often leads to rather
puzzling results. Paradoxes abound, and there exists an impressive range of different views
on possible gains and costs from cooperation and commitment schemes. In a political
context, these diverse views are a source of constant debate. Examples of controversially
discussed cooperation and commitment schemes are, just to name a few among many
others, the Stability and Growth Pact of the European Monetary Union, international
agreements on exchange rates or the adoption of currency boards.
These debates have clear counterparts in the academic literature. A particularly startling
example of the unsettling state of discussion on policy interactions is provided by two
recent contributions on policymaking in monetary unions. On the one hand, Chari and
Kehoe (2002, 2007) consider a monetary union model which abstracts from any direct
fiscal spillovers between countries and which nevertheless has the feature that equilib-
rium outcomes depend sensitively on the (non)-availability of cooperation schemes and
the sequencing of actions of policymakers. In particular, equilibrium outcomes depend
sensitively on whether the central bank in a monetary union can move prior to national
fiscal authorities, as this device helps to prevent pressures to monetize national deficits,
related to private sector coordination failures within countries and their relationship to
the common monetary policy. In striking contrast to this finding, Dixit and Lambertini
(2003) consider a monetary union model which allows for direct fiscal spillovers between
countries and which nevertheless has the feature that policymakers can always attain the
same equilibrium outcome, irrespective of whether policymakers cooperate or not and
irrespective of the order in which they choose their actions.
Similarly rich analytical results, leading to distinctly different conclusions, are offered by
the literature on international monetary policy cooperation. Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000,
2002), for example, using a fully micro-founded open-economy model, derive exact condi-
tions under which cooperative and self-oriented (Nash) policies of monetary policymakers
yield the same outcome. This finding is at odds with earlier contributions to this literature
like Rogoff (1985) and Canzoneri and Henderson (1988, 1991), who stressed not only the
scope for gains from international policy cooperation, but also showed that attempts to
internalize such gains could become counterproductive under a particular sequencing of
actions (related to private sector activities). Also in most of the very recent contributions
the benchmark result of Obstfeld and Rogoff is not uncontested. Canzoneri et al (2005),
for example, argue that in micro-founded general equilibrium settings the scope for gains
from cooperation, if anything, has increased compared with the older literature which was
based on ad-hoc welfare objectives.
These conflicting views, all based on tractable theoretical models, indicate that there is a
need of a comprehensive framework of policy interactions which could be used to evaluate
and compare various commitment and cooperation assumptions from a unified perspective.
Against this background, the goal of the present paper is more modest, namely to provide
a clear taxonomy which can be used to understand why some of the above mentioned
studies obtain irrelevance results with respect to cooperation and commitment schemes,
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while others do not.1
To this end, we set up a simple, generic framework for the analysis of strategic interactions
among independent but interdependent players. In particular, we use the concept of a
‘coalition structure’ to characterize cooperative behavior between a particular group of
players and the concept of a ‘commitment pattern’ to characterize a particular order of
moves of players.2 Using this two-dimensional characterization of games, we provide a
number of propositions which develop conditions under which games characterized by
different commitment patterns and coalition structures can admit the same equilibrium
outcome. For this to happen it is crucial that certain spillover effects vanish at the common
solution of these games. We provide a detailed discussion of these spillovers, showing that,
in general, commitment and cooperation are non-trivial issues. Yet, assuming consensus on
the target values of all players, we show that commitment patterns and coalition structures
become entirely irrelevant if i) the framework has a certain linear-quadratic structure,
ii) the players have access to sufficiently many independent instruments (relative to the
number of squared gaps which appear in their payoff functions) and iii) if the economy
reaches a social optimum when all gaps are closed.
As we show, this taxonomy is sufficiently general to account for the above mentioned
broad range of findings on the (ir)relevance of cooperation and commitment in the recent
literature, both within monetary unions and among fully sovereign nations. In particular,
the framework of Dixit and Lambertini (2003) and the benchmark model of Obstfeld and
Rogoff (2000, 2002) have representations which satisfy all three criteria. Chari and Kehoe
(2002, 2007) is an example which does not satisfy the first criterion, since it is not based
on a linear-quadratic set-up. Rogoff (1985), Canzoneri and Henderson (1988, 1991), and
Canzoneri et al (2005) are all examples which do not satisfy the second criterion, i.e. the
relevance of strategic interactions is driven by the shortage of policy instruments within
linear-quadratic set-ups. Finally, the paper by Obstfeld and Rogoff (2002) allows for an
extension which leads to a qualification of their benchmark result. This extension does
not satisfy the third criterion, i.e. it is typically no longer socially optimal to stabilize the
economy at the level at which all squared gaps are closed if this level itself suffers from
further distortions, related, for example, to incomplete risk sharing.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 develops a general framework
to study commitment and cooperation issues in games with multiple players. It then offers
a number of general propositions on the (ir)relevance of commitment patterns and coalition
structures. In Section 3, we apply these propositions to discuss recent contributions on
policy interactions in monetary unions. In Section 4, we apply these propositions to discuss
recent contributions on international policy coordination. Section 5 concludes. Proofs and
some technical issues are delegated to the Appendix.
1We offer at this stage no further discussion of the related literature, since our taxonomy was initially
motivated to cover exactly the papers cited so far, all of them being widely cited benchmark studies in
their fields. However, related literature in either of the two fields is discussed in more depth below when
we address the two areas in detail.
2As discussed below in some applications, if some of the players belong to the private sector this broad
concept of a commitment pattern naturally relates to time inconsistency issues, which typically occur for
certain (but not all) timing structures of private and public sector moves.
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2 A unifying framework for policy analysis
2.1 Players
We consider a world economy, consisting of N nations with index i. In each nation, there
coexist private agents and national policymakers. Moreover, there exist international
policymakers. We refer to a generic player in this world economy, be it a private agent,
a national policymaker, or an international policymaker, as ξ, and the set of players as
Ξ = {1, .., ξ, .., X} . A particular action of player ξ is denoted by xξ ∈ Xξ, with Xξ being
the set of actions available to player ξ. The payoff function of player ξ is given by
Vξ = Vξ(x),
where the vector x summarizes the actions of all players, i.e. x = (xξ,x−ξ), and Vξ(x) is
assumed to be continuously differentiable in its arguments, ∀ξ ∈ Ξ. In Sections 3 and 4, we
will refine this notation in order to distinguish explicitly between private agents, national
policymakers, and international policymakers. However, to establish some general results
on cooperation and commitment such a differentiated notation is not needed.
2.2 Commitment
We denote by Γ an extensive form game. There are TΓ stages in this game, and we denote
by T Γ the set of stages: {1, .., t, .., TΓ}. We assume that each player is allocated to act at
a particular stage and he plays only once in the entire game, at this particular stage. To
define the order of moves of players (in the following for short: ‘commitment pattern’),
determining at which stage every player acts, we use the following:
Definition 1 A commitment pattern C specifies an assignment for each player ξ ∈ Ξ to
act at one particular stage t ∈ T Γ, denoted by t(ξ).
2.3 Coalitions
Players may form coalitions. Coalitions can only be formed between players who are allo-
cated to act at the same stage. This is the standard assumption made in macroeconomic
games, excluding repeated games. A coalition is a subset of players who cooperate. Any
coalition Cθ is defined by three characteristics: i) it decides jointly over the actions chosen
by all its members, ii) its members play simultaneously: ∀ξ, ξ′ ∈ Cθ, t(ξ) = t(ξ
′) and iii)
it maximizes the welfare W
θ
of its members, with
W
θ
=
∑
ξ∈Cθ
ωξVξ(x),
where ωξ denotes the weight attached by the coalition members to the welfare of player ξ.
Notice that a membership to a coalition is different from the usual definition of member-
ship, in the sense that it is assumed that all agents belong to one coalition only. Moreover,
to simplify notation, we define coalitions in a broad sense so that they also include sin-
gletons (i.e. players acting in isolation) as special cases. We denote by Θ the number of
coalitions and define a coalition structure as a partition of Ξ, that is:
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Definition 2 A coalition structure C = {C1, ..., Cθ, ..., CΘ} is a partition of Ξ, that is:
i) Cθ ∩Cθ′ = ∅ for all θ = θ
′, ii)
Θ
∪
θ=1
Cθ = Ξ.
We denote by CΞ the ‘grand coalition’ formed by all players. In sum, a game is char-
acterized by a commitment pattern C and a coalition structure C. Games are solved by
backward induction. Later on we will compare equilibrium outcomes of games charac-
terized by different coalitions structures and commitment patterns. To facilitate such
comparisons, we assume throughout that for any player ξ equilibrium actions can be de-
duced from decision rules which are continuously differentiable in the actions of players
acting at the same stage or at previous stages, i.e. xξ = xξ(x
′
−ξ), where x
′
−ξ contains only
actions of players ξ′ satisfying t(ξ′) ≤ t(ξ).
2.4 Spillovers
Given the existence of coalitions, spillover effects between agents will play a crucial role
in the rest of our analysis. Generally speaking, the welfare effects of a particular action of
a player can be decomposed into three distinct effects, namely the effects on his own wel-
fare, the effects on the welfare of his coalition members (within-coalition spillover effects),
and the effects on the welfare of players belonging to different coalitions (between-coalition
spillover effects). In the context of multi-stage games these effects do not only include
direct effects, but also indirect effects which are related to anticipated actions of play-
ers acting at subsequent stages. To capture these different effects, we use the following
characterizations of spillovers.
Definition 3 Direct spillovers
For a given commitment pattern and coalition structure (C,C) and a given vector of actions
x, consider a representative player ξ ∈ Cθ. Consider a second player ξ
′. We refer to
∂Vξ′ (x)
∂xξ
as a direct within-coalition (between-coalition) spillover effect if ξ′ belongs (does not
belong) to Cθ.
Definition 4 Indirect spillovers
For a given commitment pattern and coalition structure (C,C) and a given vector of actions
x, consider a representative player ξ ∈ Cθ. Consider a second player ξ
′ and a third player
ξ′′ playing at the subsequent stage. Then,
∂Vξ′ (x)
∂xξ′′
∂xξ′′
∂xξ
denotes an indirect within-coalition
(between-coalition) spillover effect between ξ and ξ′ if ξ′ belongs (does not belong) to Cθ.
Notice that for the indirect within-coalition spillover effect described in Definition 4 to
exist, it is necessary that the term ∂Vξ′(x)/∂xξ′′ is non-zero. The latter term, according
to Definition 3, is a direct between-coalition spillover effect which links two players acting
at different stages. Later on we will frequently exploit this particular relationship between
indirect within-coalitions spillovers and direct between-coalitions spillovers.
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2.5 Comparing games
A large number of different games can be played in this economy, varying in terms of com-
mitment patterns and coalition structures. In the following we establish conditions which
can be used to compare equilibrium outcomes of two different games Γ and Γ′. We denote
by Z(Γ) (Z(Γ′)) the set of interior subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) outcomes
associated with Γ (Γ′) and by z an element of Z(Γ). A sufficient (but rather restrictive)
condition for a second game Γ′ to admit the same SPNE outcome is the following:3
Proposition 1 Consider a game Γ, characterized by (C,C), and a game Γ′, characterized
by (C′,C′). Then, an element z belongs to Z(Γ) and Z(Γ′) if at z
i) for any (ξ, ξ′), ξ ∈ Cθ, ξ
′
∈ C
θ
′ , Cθ ∈ C, Cθ′ ∈ C, t(ξ) = t(ξ
′
),
and for any (ξ, ξ′), ξ ∈ C
′
θ, ξ
′
∈ C
′
θ
′ , C
′
θ ∈ C
′, C
′
θ
′ ∈ C′, t(ξ) = t(ξ
′
)
∂Vξ′(z)
∂xξ
= 0,
ii) for any (ξ, ξ′), ξ ∈ C
′
θ, ξ
′
∈ C
′
θ, C
′
θ ∈ C
′, C
′
θ /∈ C,
∂Vξ′(z)
∂xξ
= 0.
Proof: see appendix.
Part i) requires that at the vector z there exist in either game no direct between-coalition
spillover effects between players belonging to coalitions playing at different stages. Part ii)
requires that at the vector z there exist no direct within-coalition spillover effects between
players belonging to a coalition which does not belong simultaneously to C and C′.
Proposition 1 follows from backward induction. It gives us conditions such that two differ-
ent games can have the same SPNE outcome despite differences in terms of commitment
patterns and coalition structures. These conditions are related to the absence of certain
spillover effects at the equilibrium outcome z. Notice that Proposition 1 does not require
the absence of all spillover effects at z. Such non-vanishing spillover effects can be of two
varieties: they can be i) direct between-coalition spillover effects between coalitions acting
at the same stage, or ii) direct within-coalition spillover effects in coalitions which exist in
both games. In other words, a common equilibrium outcome z is not necessarily a solution
of the simultaneous Nash game, obtained when all players act as singletons.
2.6 The simultaneous game ΓNash : a special benchmark
In order to establish an important benchmark, let ΓNash denote the reference game which
is played by all players simultaneously (i.e. no commitment as there exist no sequential
3Throughout, the second-order conditions for a maximum are assumed to be satisfied. Notice that in
the linear-quadratic applications discussed below this assumption will always be satisfied.
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stages) and without any coalitions. We denote by zNash an equilibrium outcome of this
‘no-commitment and no-cooperation’ game. Moreover, let ZΞ denote the set of equilibrium
outcomes corresponding to the grand coalition. Proposition 1 can then be extended as
follows:
Proposition 2 Consider the ‘no-commitment and no-cooperation’ game ΓNash, admitting
the Nash equilibrium outcome zNash. Then zNash belongs to ZΞ and more generally to
Z(Γ) for any extensive-form game Γ, characterized by arbitrary commitment patterns and
coalition structures, if
∂Vξ′(z
Nash)
∂xξ
= 0,∀ξ, ξ
′
∈ Ξ.
This condition requires that there are no direct spillover effects between any pair of players
(ξ, ξ′) at zNash. Proposition 2 follows directly from the proof of Proposition 1 and it uses
the well-known result that a Nash equilibrium belongs to the set of equilibria corresponding
to the grand coalition if there are no direct spillover effects between any pair of players.
Exploiting this feature, it states conditions under which cooperation and commitment are
entirely irrelevant. These conditions are quite stringent but they cannot be ruled out.4
2.7 The linear-quadratic model for policy analysis
The results presented in the previous section can be used to shed some light on the nature
of policy interactions in linear-quadratic models. This approach to policy analysis has a
long established tradition, dating back to Theil (1964), and our discussion of key policy
applications will show that this approach is, indeed, still very much in use. Let us write
such a model as follows, using our setting. Consider an economy withX players indexed by
ξ. The economy is described by a linear model, that is there exists a P ×1−vector y which
summarizes the state of the economy. This vector depends linearly on the X × 1−vector
of actions of all players x
y = y+Bx, (1)
with y being a vector of constants. The p−th element of y, yp, characterizes the aggregate
variable p, with p = 1, 2, ..., P. Let y∗ denote a P × 1−vector of target values of these
variables, with p − th element y∗p. It is assumed that the target values are shared by all
agents. Moreover, assume P = X and let the X × X−matrix B being invertible. The
payoff function corresponding to player ξ is a weighted sum of squared deviations of the
elements of y from their target values, such that:
Vξ =
1
2
[
ωξ1(y
∗
1 − y1)
2 + ...+ ωξp(y
∗
p − yp)
2 + ...+ ωξX(y
∗
X − yX)
2
]
. (2)
Notice that individual payoffs depend on the actions of other players through the model
itself (i.e. the B−matrix) and the player-specific weights ωξ  0 in the payoff functions.
4 In many applications differences in commitment patterns or coalition structures are restricted to sub-
games, while early stages are identical for the games to be compared. It is straightforward to adapt the
reasoning of Propositions 1 and 2 to such a special constellation by applying the conditions specified in
the two propositions to the subgames which make the games under comparison different.
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To restrict the analysis to non-degenerate cases, we assume that for every variable p there
exists a pair of values ωξp > 0 and bpξ = 0 (where the representative entry bpξ ∈ B denotes
the marginal effect of player ξ on the variable p) for at least one player ξ = 1, 2, ..., X.
Proposition 3 For an economy described by (1) and (2), the unique Nash equilibrium
outcome zNash = B−1 [y∗ − y] of the simultaneous Nash game ΓNash belongs to Z(Γ) for
any extensive-form game Γ characterized by arbitrary commitment patterns and coalition
structures.
Proof: see appendix.
Proposition 3 states that in a linear-quadratic model under the assumptions made above
neither commitment nor cooperation matter. This result follows directly from Proposition
2 since in the linear-quadratic model all direct spillover effects between any pair of players
(ξ, ξ′) vanish at the unique Nash equilibrium. Proposition 3 is reminiscent of the analysis
offered by Tinbergen (1952). In fact, it may be seen as a generalized Tinbergen rule in
a game-theoretical environment, assuming that there is no disagreement about the target
values of all players. It is central to stress that this result relies not only on the linear-
quadratic nature of the problem, but also on the assumption that each player disposes of
an instrument and that the number of independent instruments matches the number of
squared gaps in the payoff functions of all players (i.e. P = X).5
2.8 Stochastic extension of the linear-quadratic model
There exists an obvious extension of Proposition 3 to a particular stochastic environment.
Assume the economy is subject to S shocks, summarized by the S×1−vector ε, with mean
zero and variance-covariance matrix Ωε. The economy is described by a linear model, i.e.
there exists a P × 1−vector y of aggregate variables which depend linearly on the vector
ε as well as on the X × 1−vector x of actions of all players
y = y+Bxx+Bεε, ε ∼(0,Ωε), (3)
with y being a vector of constants. Again, we impose P = X such that Bx denotes an
X × X−matrix, which is assumed to be invertible, while Bε denotes a X × S−matrix.
All players choose ex ante (i.e. before the realization of ε) non-cooperatively policy rules
which are linear in ε, i.e.
x = r+Rεε, (4)
where r is a (X×1)-vector andRε is a (X×S)-matrix.
6 Let the stacked matrixR = [r,Rε]
summarize the actions of all players, with R being a X × (S + 1)−matrix. Suppose that
5For a recent discussion of linear-quadratic frameworks for policy purposes see, in particular, Woodford
(2003). Yet, in his applications the Tinbergen criterion (of assuming an identical number of objectives and
independent instruments) is typically not satisfied.
6We deliberately use this loose wording (rather than to say that players ‘commit’ via rules) in order to
avoid misunderstandings with our usage of the term commitment (i.e. the ‘order of moves of players’), as
described in Definition 1.
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the expected payoff of player ξ can be represented as
E(Vξ) =
1
2
E
[
ωξ1(y
∗
1 − y1)
2 + ...+ ωξp(y
∗
p − yp)
2 + ...+ ωξX(y
∗
X − yX)
2
]
, (5)
Assume that for every variable p there exists a pair of values ωξp > 0 and bxpξ = 0 (where
the representative entry bxpξ ∈ Bx denotes the marginal effect of player ξ on the variable
p) for at least one player ξ = 1, 2, ...,X.
Proposition 4 For an economy described by (3)-(5) the unique Nash equilibrium outcome
RNash= [rNash,RNashε ], with r
Nash = B−1x (y
∗−y) and RNashε = −B
−1
x ·Bε, of the simul-
taneous Nash game ΓNash belongs to Z(Γ) for any extensive-form game Γ characterized
by arbitrary commitment patterns and coalition structures.
Proof: see appendix.
Finally, for further reference, we consider a closely related variant of Proposition 4 which
gives the entire variance-covariance matrix of y, denoted by Ωy, a role in the expected
payoffs of players. Specifically, with (3) being unchanged, we replace, ceteris paribus, the
policy rule (4) and the specification of expected payoffs ( 5) by
x = r+Rεε (6)
E(Vξ) = E(V˜ξ) +ω
′
ξΩyωξ, (7)
where (7) assumes that E(Vξ) can be decomposed into an autonomous component E(V˜ξ)
and a quadratic form ω′ξΩyωξ, describing a player-specific weighted sum of the variance
and covariance terms associated with y. Because of these features, the (X × S)−matrix
Rε summarizes in (6) the relevant strategic components of x, i.e. r can be kept fixed at
r, and one can show:
Corollary to Proposition 4 : For an economy described by (3), (6), and (7) the unique
Nash equilibrium outcome RNashε = −B
−1
x ·Bε of the simultaneous Nash game Γ
Nash be-
longs to Z(Γ) for any extensive-form game Γ characterized by arbitrary commitment pat-
terns and coalition structures.
Proof: see appendix.
3 Monetary Unions
This section uses the broad framework developed above to address the question under
which circumstances cooperation and commitment matter in a monetary union. In general,
the possible existence of spillovers within countries (related to private actors), of spillovers
between countries (related to fiscal and private actors) and of a common monetary policy
(affecting players in all countries) creates a number of channels which make this question
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non-trivial, i.e. it is clear that, in general, commitment and cooperation (i.e. coalition
structures) do matter, within countries and between countries.
Against this general insight two recently established findings seem particularly puzzling.7
On the one hand, Dixit and Lambertini (2003) consider a model which allows for direct
spillovers between players acting in different countries and which nevertheless has the
feature that fiscal and monetary policymakers attain the same equilibrium outcome, ir-
respective of the commitment pattern and of whether policies are coordinated between
countries or not. By contrast, Chari and Kehoe (2002) consider a model which abstracts
from any direct spillovers between players acting in different countries and which neverthe-
less has the feature that equilibrium outcomes depend sensitively on commitment patterns
and on whether policies are coordinated between countries or not.8
Within the framework of Section 2, however, it is straightforward to resolve this puzzle.
To this end, let us consider a monetary union with N member countries, indexed by
i = 1, 2, .., N. Let Mi denote the set of all private agents in country i. Let aij denote
an action of private agent j in country i and let ai = (aij,ai,−j). For each country there
exists a single fiscal policymaker (with action τ i). Moreover, there exists a single monetary
policymaker operating for the monetary union as a whole (with action π). In sum, a profile
of actions of all players is given by x = (a, τ ,π), with τ = (τ i, τ−i) and a = (ai, a−i). We
consider the following payoff functions:
• Payoff function of a representative private agent j in country i:
Uij = Uij(a, τ , π). (8)
• Payoff function of fiscal policymaker in country i :
Vi = Vi(a, τ , π) (9)
• Payoff function of cooperating fiscal policymakers:
V FC =
n∑
i=1
ωFi Vi =
n∑
i=1
ωFi Vi(a, τ , π) (10)
where ωFi denotes the fiscal weight of country i in the collective fiscal payoff function.
• Payoff function of the central bank:
VM =
n∑
i=1
ωMi Vi =
n∑
i=1
ωMi Vi(a, τ , π). (11)
where ωMi denotes the monetary weight attached to country i by the central bank.
7Evidently, there exists a broad literature on strategic policy interactions in monetary unions going back
at least to Mundell (1961). For recent contributions, using reduced-form one shot games, see, in particular,
Beetsma and Bovenberg (1998, 2001), Calmfors (2001), Cukierman and Lippi (2001), and Uhlig (2003). For
examples of ‘second-generation’ models, as discussed in Section 4.2. below, see Lombardo and Sutherland
(2004), Beetsma and Jensen (2005), Ferrero (2007), and Gali and Monacelli (2007).
8For a closely related, but slightly less general analysis, see also Chari and Kehoe (2007).
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Equations (9)-(11) rule out disagreement about the targets between policymakers, i.e. we
restrict possible differences between monetary and fiscal policy objectives to the weighting
factors ωFi and ω
M
i .
9 This general set-up can be used to analyze a large number of different
policy constellations. To give the analysis a clear focus, we make a number of simplifying
assumptions, in line with the cited literature. First, we consider only games in which
all fiscal policymakers act at the same stage. Similarly, all private players act at the
same stage. Second, we consider only fully symmetric set-ups, characterized by identical
payoff functions within each group of players. Because of this assumption, all equilibrium
outcomes are symmetric, satisfying aij = a for all i, j and τ i = τ for all i. Third, we rule out
coalitions between private agents and policymakers, implying that spillovers between these
groups of players are always between-coalition spillovers. Finally, it is worth emphasizing
that in this general set-up there is scope for four different types of direct within-coalition
spillovers: i) direct fiscal spillovers between countries (∂Vi∂τ l = 0, i = l), ii) direct private
spillovers between countries (
∂Uij
∂alj
= 0, i = l), iii) direct private spillovers within countries
(
∂Uij
∂aik
= 0, j = k), and iv) direct spillovers between fiscal policy-makers and the central
bank. The latter type of spillover can often be neglected, however, since it can only occur
if there exist direct fiscal spillovers between countries.10
3.1 A simple irrelevance result for cooperation and commitment
To establish a clear link to the set-up of Section 2, consider first a set of benchmark
assumptions under which cooperation and commitment for all players become entirely
irrelevant. To this end, replace (8) and (9) against
Uij = Uij(aij, τ i, π) (12)
Vi =
∑
j∈Mi
ωijUij(aij , τ i, π) (13)
and consider the three payoff functions Uij, Vi, and V
M , belonging to the three types of
players which need to be considered in the special game ΓNash. In generic terms these
particular payoff functions satisfy two strong assumptions:
A1: Absence of any direct private and fiscal spillovers: ∂Vi∂τ l =
∂Uij
∂alj
=
∂Uij
∂aik
≡ 0, i = l, j = k.
A2: Congruence of payoff functions of private agents and policymakers: Vi =
∑
j∈Mi
ωijUij .
These two assumptions imply that any symmetric equilibrium of the special game ΓNash
satisfies the requirements of Proposition 2:
9 Implications of disagreement about the targets between policymakers are discussed, in particular, in
Beetsma and Uhlig (1999) and Dixit and Lambertini (2001, 2003b).
10 In other words, in any symmetric equilibrium ∂Vi
∂π
= 0 will always be ensured by ∂V
M
∂π
= 0, while
∂VM
∂τi
= ωMi
∂Vi
∂τi
+
∑
l=i ω
M
l
∂Vl
∂τi
= 0 will be ensured by ∂Vi
∂τi
= 0 if there are no direct fiscal spillovers
between countries.
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Proposition 5 (Irrelevance of coalitions structures and commitment patterns)
Assume that A1 and A2 are satisfied and that the game ΓNash admits a symmetric Nash
equilibrium, with outcome zNash. Then, any extensive-form game Γ′, characterized by ar-
bitrary commitment patterns and coalition structures, admits this outcome since there are
no direct spillovers between any pair of players at zNash.
Proof: A1 and A2 ensure that in any symmetric equilibrium the Nash requirement
∂Uij
∂aij
= 0
implies ∂Vi∂aij = 0,
∂VM
∂aij
= 0. Similarly, ∂Vi∂τ i = 0 implies
∂Uij
∂τ i
= 0, ∂V
M
∂τ i
= 0, and ∂V
M
∂π = 0
implies ∂Vi
∂π
= 0,
∂Uij
∂π
= 0, for all i, j. Hence, Proposition 2 applies.
Evidently, for Proposition 5 to prevail at this level of generality, both assumptions stressed
above are crucial.11 Against this background, it is straightforward to motivate the partic-
ular contributions of Chari and Kehoe (2002) and of Dixit and Lambertini (2003). The
key contribution of Chari and Kehoe (2002) is to show that generically the broad irrele-
vance result of Proposition 5 disappears if one relaxes at least one of the two assumptions
A1 or A2. By contrast, the analysis by Dixit and Lambertini (2003) can be used to see
that, even if assumptions A1 and A2 are not satisfied, the irrelevance result can reappear
if the economy satisfies the additional constraints of a linear-quadratic framework in line
with Proposition 3. These additional restrictions make it possible that in equilibrium all
direct spillovers between all players vanish at zNash, which is sufficient for Proposition 2
to apply.
3.2 The Chari-Kehoe model
The model of Chari and Kehoe (2002) leads to conclusions which are in spirit very different
from the irrelevance result of Proposition 5. To this end, the model introduces, ceteris
paribus, one subtle variation into the model of Section 3.1 by replacing (12) against
Uij = Uij(aij ,ai,−j , τ i, π). (14)
The key property of (14) is that it generically allows for direct private spillovers within
countries (
∂Uij
∂aik
= 0, j = k) and the model has no channel which makes these spillovers
vanish in equilibrium. Consequently,
∂Uij
∂aij
= 0  ∂Vi
∂aij
= 0, ∂V
M
∂aij
= 0. This feature is
sufficient to make the result of Proposition 5 not applicable. In short, the core assumptions
of Chari and Kehoe can be summarized as:
A1’:Absence of direct private and fiscal spillovers between countries: ∂Vi∂τ l =
∂Uij
∂alj
≡ 0, i = l.
A2: Congruence of payoff functions of private agents and policymakers: Vi =
∑
j∈Mi
ωijUij .
Assuming non-cooperative private sector behavior, Chari and Kehoe show that in a mone-
tary union the strong assumption of zero direct private and fiscal spillovers between coun-
tries is not sufficient to make fiscal cooperation between countries irrelevant. Instead,
11Notice that because there are no direct spillovers between any pair of players, the irrelevance result,
in fact, covers also mixed coalitions between private agents and policymakers.
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non-internalized private spillovers within countries are enough to ensure that fiscal co-
operation becomes relevant at least for some commitment patterns. In other words, for
some commitment patterns non-internalized private spillovers within countries can create
indirect fiscal spillovers between countries which make fiscal cooperation desirable. To
make the implications of this feature precise, Chari and Kehoe compare fiscal cooperation
and non-cooperation under two different commitment patterns:
CI (monetary policy moves last): i/ τ i, ii/ aij, iii/ π.
CII (monetary policy moves first): i/ π, ii/ τ i, iii/ aij .
Comparing fiscal cooperation and non-cooperation under CI and CII , the two main propo-
sitions of Chari and Kehoe (2002), adopted to our framework, can be summarized as
follows:12
Chari-Kehoe (2002): Assume there are no direct spillovers between any players acting
in different countries. Then, fiscal cooperation between countries is nevertheless relevant
under certain commitment patterns. Specifically, under CII , with monetary policy mov-
ing first, the equilibrium outcomes of fiscal cooperation vs. non-cooperation are identical.
However, under CI , with monetary policy moving last, the equilibrium outcomes of fiscal
cooperation vs. non-cooperation differ because of indirect fiscal spillovers related to a time
inconsistency problem of monetary policy.
The irrelevance of fiscal cooperation under CII is rather obvious: at stage iii), private
agents in country i take as given τ i and π. Hence, when fiscal policy is decided at stage
ii), there exist, for a given value of π, neither direct nor indirect fiscal spillovers between
countries. By contrast, under the commitment pattern CI this same reasoning does not
apply because of indirect fiscal spillovers induced by the interaction of private agents and
union-wide monetary policy.13
The main contribution of Chari and Kehoe is to discuss thoroughly the subtle role of
private sector behavior in this context. In general, it is well-known that monetary policy, if
it cannot credibly move prior to the other actors, may be a source of indirect fiscal spillovers
in a monetary union, reflecting the logic of a last-round bailout motive of monetary policy.
For this argument to prevail under the particularly stringent assumptions A1’ and A2 it
is crucial that non-cooperative private sector behavior reinforces these spillovers such that
monetary policy cannot undo them at the margin by means of a simple envelope theorem
argument. To put it differently, if private sector agents expect a monetary reaction to
earlier fiscal decisions and if the private sector itself suffers within each country from
a (plausible) coordination problem, then this latter feature creates a fiscal cooperation
problem in the first place which cannot be undone by monetary policy at a later stage.
12See Propositions 1 and 2, Chari and Kehoe (p. 9-12, 2002).
13To rephrase this finding in the more detailed language of our Proposition 1 (which, anyway, does not
apply in full because of the neglect of private sector cooperation): indirect fiscal within-coalition spillovers
exist under CI (but not CII), because of between-coalition spillovers between fiscal players and private
players, i.e. these latter spillovers are themselves a function of the timing of the monetary policy action.
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In sum, by invoking the special assumptions A1’ and A2, Chari and Kehoe emphasize a
source of (indirect) fiscal spillovers which is specific to monetary unions.
To conclude this subsection it is worth making three comments. First, as summarized in
the Appendix, one can show that under the special assumptions A1’ and A2 the commit-
ment pattern CI is, in fact, the only one which makes fiscal cooperation relevant. Second,
it is well understood that in the broad class of economies studied by Chari and Kehoe fiscal
cooperation becomes under all commitment patterns generically relevant if one relaxes A1’
and allows for direct fiscal spillover effects between countries, irrespective of whether the
lack of commitment of monetary policy may induce an additional fiscal cooperation prob-
lem. Third, given the discussion underlying Proposition 3, it is clear that linear-quadratic
specifications of the Chari-Kehoe economy exist which lead to additional constraints that
make coalition structures and commitment patterns irrelevant. In particular, in order to
ensure that the crucial derivative
∂Uij
∂aik
vanishes in equilibrium, these specifications need
to satisfy that the number of squared gaps in the payoff functions of all players matches
the number of available independent instruments, without sacrificing the overall structure
imposed by (11), (13) and (14).
3.3 The Dixit-Lambertini model
The model of Dixit and Lambertini (2003) can be rewritten as a closely related variant of
(8)-(11) which replaces (8) and (9) against
Uij = Ui = U = U(a, π) (15)
Vi = Vi(a, τ i, τ−i, π). (16)
Considering (15) and (16), two deviations from the benchmark model are worth stressing.
First, there exists a uniform private sector throughout the monetary union such that
private sector behavior reduces to aij = a for all i, j, implying that there are no direct
private spillovers, be they within countries or between countries. However, the payoff
function Vi allows, in general, for direct fiscal spillover effects between countries. Second,
payoff functions of private agents and policymakers are not congruent. In short, key
features of this set-up can be summarized as:
A1”: Existence of direct fiscal spillovers between countries.
A2”: Non-congruence of payoff functions of private agents and policymakers.
Notice that because of these assumptions, unless further restrictions are introduced, there
exist direct benefits from fiscal cooperation between countries. Moreover, the framework
allows, in principle, for direct between-coalition spillover effects (as captured by ∂U/∂π
and ∂Vi/∂a), making also commitment patterns non-trivial. Notwithstanding these two
properties, the analysis of Dixit and Lambertini gives rise to a general irrelevance propo-
sition of coalitions structures and commitment patterns. The driving force behind this
strong result is easily identified if one recognizes that the analysis is conducted within
a linear-quadratic framework in line with Section 2.7. Specifically, the scalar a, summa-
rizing union-wide private sector actions, denotes private sector inflation expectations, i.e.
13
a ≡ πe, and all equilibria satisfy the assumption of rational expectations such that πe = π.
This feature can be recovered from writing U as
U = U(πe, π) =
1
2
(π − πe)2,
i.e. πe = π results from a minimization of the squared inflation forecast error. Moreover,
the policy objective Vi represents a weighted sum of squared deviations of country-specific
output (yi) and union-wide inflation values from target values, denoted by y
∗
i and π
∗ = 0,
respectively, such that
Vi =
1
2
[
ωi(y
∗
i − yi)
2 + π2
]
,
while the output levels depend linearly on the vector of actions x = (πe, τ i, τ−i, π)
14:
yi = yi +
n∑
k=1
bikτk + bi(π − π
e). (17)
By construction of U, Vi, and V
M , there is consensus on the target values between all
players under all conceivable cooperation and commitment schemes. Hence, as shown
in the Appendix, the economy satisfies all the requirements of Proposition 3, i.e. all
direct spillovers between all players vanish at the equilibrium outcome of the game ΓNash.
Because of this feature, this outcome is identical to the social optimum (i.e. all players
always attain their target values and U = Vi = 0, ∀i), leading to a broad irrelevance
result of cooperation and commitment which, in fact, covers also mixed coalitions between
private agents and policymakers. In sum, the main proposition of Dixit and Lambertini
(2003), adopted to our framework, can be summarized as follows:
Dixit-Lambertini (2003): Assume there exist direct fiscal spillover effects between coun-
tries. Despite this feature, there are no benefits from fiscal cooperation, as long as there is
agreement about all target values of all players in a linear-quadratic framework. In fact,
these target values can be attained under arbitrary coalition structures and commitment
patterns of all players.15
14To facilitate a clear comparison with Chari and Kehoe (2002), our representation abstracts from
two features of the original Dixit-Lambertini model which are, however, inconsequential for the key result.
First, the original model decomposes inflation into a part controlled by the central bank and a contribution
related to fiscal policies. Second, the original model has a certain stochastic flavour, in the sense that the
variables yi, bik, and bi are stochastic. Yet, since policymakers react after the realizations of these variables,
the resulting ex post game is in line with the set-up of Section 2.7, where without loss of generality y and
B may also be seen as predetermined rather than as constant variables. This assessment covers also the
final scenario in the original paper of so-called ‘discretionary monetary leadership’ where fiscal policy is
strong enough to prevent genuine (ex ante) uncertainty. To see that the second point is inconsequential
for the key result, see also our discussion below at the end of Section 4.1.
15The exact wording in Proposition 1 in Dixit and Lambertini (2003, p. 245) is as follows: “If the
monetary and fiscal authorities in a monetary union have identical output and inflation goals, those goals
can be achieved without the need for fiscal coordination, without the need for monetary commitment,
irrespective of which authority moves first and despite any disagreement about the relative weights of the
two sets of objectives.” Under the particular assumption of reducing private sector behaviour to forecasting
inflation, the notion of ‘arbitrary’ timing protocols of private sector activities is not meaningful. Yet, in a
refined model with richer private sector strategies this would be different.
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This result is refreshing and provocative at the same time since it challenges the con-
ventional wisdom that the existence of spillovers should create meaningful commitment
and cooperation problems. Certainly, the model is special in many ways. For example,
private sector actions are restricted to the assumption of rational inflation expectations
at the union-wide level. Similarly, there is no role for country-specific inflation effects on
national output levels, i.e. possible tensions between such effects and policy reactions of
the central bank to union-wide inflation developments are ruled out. However, it would be
possible to introduce refinements of the model along these lines such that the irrelevance
proposition would still be supported.16
Hence, the limitations of this proposition are linked to more fundamental concerns. First,
compared with the analysis of Chari and Kehoe (2002), it is clear that linear-quadratic
frameworks, while being convenient short-cuts, are, by construction, very special. Sec-
ond, within the above summarized linear-quadratic framework the irrelevance proposition
requires that the number of squared gaps matches the number of available independent
instruments. Specifically, in the just summarized set-up there are N + 2 players (N + 1
policymakers and 1 private sector player) who face N+2 gaps and command over N+2 in-
dependent instruments, as embodied in the vector x = (πe, τ , π).17 To see the importance
of the assumption that there is no ‘instrument shortage’ it is constructive to consider the
closed-economy counterpart of the model without fiscal policy. Then, the analysis collapses
to the standard monetary policy model of Barro and Gordon (1983) where the relevance of
monetary commitment is well-known, reflecting the trade-off faced by monetary policy to
meet output and inflation objectives with a single instrument. Moreover, it is worth em-
phasizing that Dixit and Lambertini (2003) assume that monetary and fiscal policymakers
differ systematically in their effectiveness vis-à-vis the private sector. Monetary policy
suffers from the well-known time inconsistency problem, i.e. in a rational expectations
equilibrium (π = πe) monetary policy cannot close the (structural) output gap (y∗i − yi),
while fiscal polices do not face such a restriction. This fundamental difference between the
two types of policymakers is remarkably different from the otherwise symmetric treatment
of all policymakers.18
16There exist hybrid monetary unions models, like Calmfors (2001), which respect for some, but not
all reduced form equations, the linear-quadratic structure. Yet, to use them as counterexamples to the
reasoning of Dixit and Lambertini is not entirely satisfactory.
17The ‘independence’ assumption can be questioned if one explicitly acknowledges that all policy instru-
ments are tied together by a combined budget constraint of the public sector, as stressed, in particular,
by Cooper and Kempf (2004). Otherwise the model of Cooper and Kempf (2004) is very different from
Dixit and Lambertini (2003). In particular, it is not of the linear-quadratic variety. However, from a
broader perspective, the neglect of the budget constraint could be rationalized if one thinks about policy
actions without (direct) budgetary incidence, like reform measures which affect the competitiveness of
industries etc. Moreover, in a narrow fiscal context, one could assume that national treasuries have access
to balancing items which do not create spillovers between countries.
18For an analysis of an economy in which both policymakers face a time inconsistency problem, see, for
example, Adam and Billi (2006).
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4 International monetary policy cooperation
The purpose of this section is to show that the literature on international monetary pol-
icy cooperation among fully sovereign nations offers clear analytical counterparts to our
discussion of the (ir)relevance of cooperation and commitment in monetary unions. This
assessment holds true for so-called first-generation models (with ad-hoc payoff functions
similar to the economies covered so far) as well as for the by now widely used second-
generation models (where the payoff functions of policymakers are made fully consistent
from first principles with the welfare objectives of private agents).19 For either type of
model ‘irrelevance’ results obtain under particular assumptions. As we show in the remain-
der of this section, the relevant features of these assumptions can be reproduced within our
general framework. Our key references for first-generation models are Rogoff (1985) and
Canzoneri and Henderson (1988, 1991), while our discussion of second-generation models
takes the analysis of Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000, 2002) as well as the summary paper by
Canzoneri et al (2005) as the main reference points. Given the widespread use of stochastic
settings in this literature, we invoke results established in Section 2.8.
4.1 First-generation models
Rogoff (1985) and Canzoneri and Henderson (1988, 1991) offer widely cited contributions
of the first-generation type which give clear insights about the nature of cooperation
and commitment problems in international monetary policymaking.20 The Canzoneri-
Henderson model is often referred to because it can be used to see the existence of generic
benefits from cooperation between policymakers, while the analysis of Rogoff (1985) gives
rise to the insight that such benefits can prove elusive for certain commitment patterns
(depending, in particular, on the timing of private sector actions).21
Both contributions study symmetric two-country set-ups, leading to reduced forms which
duplicate the Barro-Gordon trade-offs. These trade-offs, however, are enriched with mon-
etary spillovers between the two countries. Moreover, both studies use linear-quadratic
set-ups. We offer a simplified representation which, while capturing the main insights
from the two studies, is kept deliberately similar to the exposition of the Dixit-Lambertini
model discussed above.22
There exist two equally sized and structurally identical countries with two independent
currencies. In each country, the monetary policymaker controls domestic inflation (i.e. πi
is the single instrument of the monetary policymaker in country i) and he faces an out-
put and an inflation objective. The inflation objective creates monetary spillover effects
between countries. Specifically, the inflation objective is defined in terms of CPI-inflation
19These labels are borrowed from Canzoneri et al. (2005).
20For further important contributions to this literature, see, among others, Hamada (1985) and Oudiz
and Sachs (1984), and the well-structured surveys in Devereux (1990) and Persson and Tabellini (1995).
21For a similar insight in a model with international fiscal policy cooperation, see Kehoe (1989).
22Similar to our representation, see also the discussion in Walsh (2003, ch. 6.3). In particular, deviating
from the original contributions we do not cast monetary policy in terms of money supplies, but directly in
terms of inflation outcomes.
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which, because of trade linkages, depends on both domestic and foreign inflation. More-
over, the output levels in the two countries also depend on the monetary policy instruments
of both countries. To express these interdependencies, exchange rate patterns need to be
specified. To this end, let
er = en + π2 − π1,
where er and en denote the change in the real and the nominal exchange rates, respectively.
Accordingly, an increase in er amounts to a real depreciation of the exchange rate from
the perspective of country 1. CPI-inflation of the two countries is given by
πCPI1 = βπ1 + (1− β)(π2 + en) = π1 + (1− β)er (18)
πCPI2 = βπ2 + (1− β)(π1 − en) = π2 − (1− β)er, (19)
with β ∈ (0, 1) denoting the openness of the countries in terms of consumption (i.e. a
value of β close to 1 represents strong home bias). Output in the two countries is given
by
y1 = y + bπ(π1 − π
e
1)− be(er − e
e
r) + ε (20)
y2 = y + bπ(π2 − π
e
2) + be(er − e
e
r) + ε, (21)
where ε ∼(0, σ2ε) denotes a common productivity shock, while bπ > 0 and be < 0 denote
the direct output effects of inflation and real exchange rate surprises.23 In line with
Rogoff (1985), consider the following timing protocol, to be modified below. Private
agents in both countries act (i.e. form rational expectations of π1, π2, and er) prior to
the realization of ε. Specifically, private agents, anticipating symmetric policy reactions
to the common shock ε, correctly expect that the real exchange rate remains unchanged,
i.e. eer = er = 0. Policymakers in both countries act after the shock ε has been observed.
Assuming πCPIi
∗ = 0, the expected (ex-ante) payoffs of policymakers are given by
E[Vi] =
1
2
E
[
ω(y∗ − yi)
2 + (πCPIi )
2
]
, i = 1, 2. (22)
Policymakers are assumed to follow rules which are linear in ε, in line with (4) in Section
2.8. Given the assumed timing protocol, it is instructive to consider first games which
involve only the two policymakers. When optimizing ex ante over the reaction coefficients
in the policy rules to maximize (22), policymakers take as given the rational expectations
of exchange and inflation rates of the private sector (which can be calculated by backward
induction). Then, comparing cooperative vs. non-cooperative behavior of policymakers,
it is possible to show
E[V nci ]−E[V
c
i ] =
1
2
σ2ε [φ
nc
ε − φ
c
ε] +
1
2
(y∗ − y)2
[
φncy∗ − φ
c
y∗
]
i = 1, 2 (23)
with : φncε − φ
c
ε > 0 and φ
nc
y∗ − φ
c
y∗ < 0,
23This assumption is necessary to ensure that the perceived total effect of inflation surprises on home
output (bπ+ be) is smaller than the direct effect (bπ), reflecting the dampening effect of a real appreciation
of the exchange rate on home output. Hence, under non-cooperation, the exchange rate channel has a
disciplining effect on inflation incentives. This feature is key for the results summarized below.
17
where the latter condition requires a mild restriction on be and β which, together with
the φ-terms, is stated in the Appendix. Notice that E[V ] is expressed as a ‘loss’, i.e.
low values should be preferred to high ones. From the expressions for the φ−terms one
easily verifies that the cooperative and non-cooperative solutions coincide in the special
case in which there are no direct monetary spillovers between countries (requiring β = 1
and b2 = 0). In sum, this stylized representation reproduces the following two well-known
results from the literature.
Rogoff (1985) and Canzoneri-Henderson (1988, 1991):
In general, coalition structures and commitment patterns are not irrelevant, notwithstand-
ing agreement about all target values of all players.
i) Assume y∗ = y, i.e. monetary policymakers face no time inconsistency problem.
Then there exist benefits from cooperation between policymakers.
ii) Assume y∗ > y, i.e. monetary policymakers face a time inconsistency problem.
Then there exist costs and benefits from cooperation between policymakers, and for y∗ −
y being sufficiently large (i.e. the time inconsistency problem being sufficiently severe),
cooperation between policymakers is not desirable.
Why is cooperation between policymakers, generically, relevant under the assumed com-
mitment pattern? Generally speaking, the equation system (18)-(22) fits the framework
discussed in Section 2.8. However, to undo the direct within-coalition spillover effects be-
tween policymakers in line with Proposition 4 would require that the number of objectives
matches the number of independent instruments. This is not the case, since in (22) there
are altogether four gaps to be closed (two output gaps and two CPI-inflation gaps), while
there are only two instruments (π1, π2) available to the policymakers. This mismatch be-
tween instruments and gaps rules out that the direct spillovers vanish at the no-cooperation
and no-commitment Nash game played by the two policymakers. Moreover, with Propo-
sition 4 being not satisfied, it is clear that these spillovers give rise to strategic conflicts
over the choice of the policy instruments also under alternative commitment patterns.
We conclude this subsection by making three comments. First, the assumed timing pro-
tocol (i.e. the assumption that the private sector acts prior to the realization of ε, while
policymakers act afterwards) helps to separate in the cooperation problem of policymakers
stabilization aspects (captured by σ2ε) from systematic inflation incentives (captured by
(y∗ − y)2). However, this protocol can also be used to see why first-generations models
have been criticized for their lack of convincing microfoundations. Specifically, under this
timing protocol it is clear that inflation expectations, while being on average correct, will
differ from realized inflation if ε = 0. But how to account for this feature from a welfare
perspective? Assume, for example, that the ex-ante payoffs of the representative private
agents in the two countries are given by
E[Ui] =
1
2
E[(πi − π
e
i )
2], i = 1, 2.
Then, as shown in the appendix, it is straightforward to establish
E[Unci ]−E[U
c
i ] =
1
2
σ2ε [ψ
nc
ε − ψ
c
ε] < 0 i = 1, 2, (24)
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indicating that under this particular measure private agents would always prefer non-
cooperation of policymakers.24 This finding is not in line with the comparison based on the
ex ante payoffs of policymakers summarized above. Given the ad-hoc specification of the
model there is no metric which could be used to address this discrepancy, indicating why
the profession has recently shifted to models with explicit microfoundations, as discussed
in Section 4.2.
Second, the instrument shortage does not disappear if one considers the alternative timing
protocol under which all players, policymakers and private agents, follow rules which
call for action after the realization of ε. Compared with the previous discussion, this
modification ensures that ex post realized inflation and inflation expectations of the private
sector will always be identical. However, it is easy to check that policymakers would still
lack independent instruments to close the gaps related to output and inflation.
Third, given the close relationship of the reduced forms with the Dixit-Lambertini frame-
work, these results may be at first sight somewhat surprising. Yet, the discrepancy simply
reflects that Rogoff (1985) and Canzoneri and Henderson (1988, 1991) deliberately allow
for a mismatch between instruments and objectives which is absent in the Dixit-Lambertini
analysis. It would be straightforward to overcome this mismatch within the above frame-
work if one introduced in each country one additional (fiscal) player with an additional
and independent instrument that relates linearly to output and CPI-inflation. To this end,
assume, ceteris paribus, instead of (20)-(21) and in line with (17)(
y1
y2
)
=
(
y
y
)
+
(
bπ(π1 − πe1)− be(er − e
e
r)
bπ(π2 − πe2) + be(er − e
e
r)
)
+Bτ
(
τ 1
τ 2
)
+
(
ε
ε
)
,
where τ1 and τ2 denote the two additional fiscal instruments and the 2 × 2−matrix Bτ
is assumed to be invertible. Assume private sector expectations are formed prior to the
realization of ε, while the four policymakers move afterwards. Then, the policymakers,
when acting non-cooperatively, will be able to achieve yi = y
∗ and πCPIi = π
CPI
i
∗ = 0 for
all realizations of ε and consistent with rational private sector expectations (πi = π
e
i and
er = e
e
r = 0, i = 1, 2) by setting their four instruments according to the rules
π1 = π2 = 0(
τ1
τ2
)
=
(
b˜11 + b˜12
b˜21 + b˜22
)
(y∗ − y) +
(
b˜11 + b˜12
b˜21 + b˜22
)
ε,
where b˜ij , i, j = 1, 2 denotes the representative entry of the matrix B
−1
τ . Consistent with
rational private sector expectations, the same outcome can be non-cooperatively imple-
mented by policymakers if the private sector forms expectations after the realization of
ε. In sum, it is easy to see that, by adding two additional instruments in the spirit of
Dixit and Lambertini, Proposition 4 applies within the augmented framework, leading to
a broad irrelevance result of coalitions structures and commitment patterns among in-
ternational policymakers, covering both monetary and fiscal policymakers. Alternatively,
24 Intuitively, the private sector does not bear costs associated with the inflation bias (i.e. the equilibrium
level of inflation), but only with the forecast error around this level. This error is larger under cooperation,
because policymakers use the inflation instrument more actively for any given realization of ε.
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rather than increasing the number of instruments, with the same effect a reduction of
objectives could be considered: for example, if the two countries were to focus solely on
the inflation objective (i.e. ωi = 0), the desirability of cooperation, once more, would
disappear.
4.2 Second-generation models
Cooperation issues are also of central importance in second-generation models. In these
models the sources of strategic conflict between countries are, by and large, similar to first-
generation models. Yet, the welfare measure of policymakers is consistently derived from
optimizing private sector behavior in a fully specified general equilibrium setting. The
latter feature implies that the range of different policy games that can be studied within
such a set-up is typically large, reflecting the richness of the underlying general equilib-
rium specification. Moreover, the strategic interaction between policymakers is typically
addressed from an ex ante perspective in rule setting games. This feature, combined with
the microfounded welfare objective, leads to a genuine importance of risk aspects (which
could not be adequately addressed by first-generation models). However, despite these
differences, it can be shown that also in second-generation models gains from cooperation
can entirely disappear if policymakers have access to sufficiently many instruments and
the economy has a suitable linear-quadratic representation.25
The framework of Obstfeld-Rogoff (2000, 2002) has been particularly influential for this
class of models. It considers a two-country extension of a New Keynesian framework with
imperfect competition and sticky wages, thereby ensuring that monetary policy has an
effective stabilization role. While the private sector sets nominal wages before the uncer-
tainty has been resolved (which is captured by random productivity shocks), monetary
policymakers act after these shocks have been realized, subject to ex ante chosen state
contingent rules. To establish a natural benchmark for the assessment of the welfare ef-
fects of monetary policy, Obstfeld and Rogoff decompose the national welfare objectives of
the two policymakers, which coincide with the expected welfare of representative private
agents in the two countries (and will be denoted below by E(V ) and E(V ∗)), into flexible-
wage components and residual components which capture the additional effects coming
from the existence of sticky wages. Based on this decomposition, a two-step procedure
can be invoked to check the (ir)relevance of monetary policy cooperation between the two
countries. First, it needs to be checked whether the flexible wage solution around which
the monetary stabilization takes place is ‘constrained Pareto efficient ex ante’. Broadly
speaking, this criterion will be satisfied if the sticky wage distortion is the only general
equilibrium distortion which is affected by monetary policy. By contrast, if the set-up
allows for further (and genuine open-economy) imperfections that can be affected by mon-
etary policy, like risk-sharing concerns under imperfect capital markets, this criterion is
25 In general, the papers cited in this Secton focus on the (ir)relevance of policy cooperation. However,
for the particular cases in which the irrelevance of policy cooperation can be established by means of the
Corollary to Proposition 4, this also implies the irrelevance of commitment patterns, i.e. policymakers
may be called to implement their actions under arbitrary orders of moves.
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typically no longer satisfied.26 Second, assuming that the first criterion is satisfied, it
needs to be established whether the flexible wage solution can be implemented by mone-
tary policy. Obstfeld and Rogoff offer a fully tractable framework which can be used to
address these features with closed-form solutions. Reproducing the model in all its details
goes beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, by drawing also on the representation of the
model by Canzoneri et al (2005), we offer a sketch that shows how the principles which
drive the (ir)relevance of policy cooperation can be linked to the Corollary to Proposition
4 of Section 2.8.
Consider the following sketch of a symmetric model of two countries, home and foreign.
Each of these countries produces three types of monopolistically competitive goods (with
the foreign produced goods denoted by a star): an aggregate non-traded good (N, N∗),
an aggregate tradeable good for the domestic market (D, D∗), and an aggregate tradeable
good for the export market (E, E∗). The latter type of goods creates the key channel of
policy interaction between the two countries, i.e. the good E (E∗) is produced in the home
(foreign) country and consumed in the foreign (home) country, with the terms of trade
being determined by monetary policy. In all sectors, production technologies are linear and
labor is the only factor of production. Preferences of the representative consumer-producer
(h) in the home country are given by27
U(h) =
C(h)1−ρ
1− ρ
− [YN (h)/EN + YD(h)/ED + YE(h)/EE ]
C(h) = C
1
3
N (h)C
1
3
D(h)C
1
3
E∗(h),
where C denotes a Cobb-Douglas consumption aggregator of the three types of goods,
ρ denotes the constant coefficient of relative risk aversion, Yj(h) the output levels of
the three types of goods produced by producer (h), and Ej the corresponding random
sector-specific productivity levels. Under flexible wages, wage setters in the underlying
Dixit-Stiglitz economy can respond to the productivity shocks, while under sticky wages
productivity levels are realized after nominal wages have been set.28 Each policymaker has
one instrument, the nominal money supply (M, M∗), which can respond to the realized
productivity shocks, subject to an ex-ante chosen rule. In equilibrium, markets for all
goods clear and the current account is assumed to be balanced every period, requiring
appropriate adjustments of equilibrium prices and the (flexible) exchange rate for given
money supplies.
Importantly, under the particular assumption of logarithmic utility (ρ = 1), the model
exhibits for all conceivable patterns of shocks perfect international risk sharing of con-
26For systematic discussions of interactions between closed-economy and open-economy distortions in
closely related models, see, among others, Corsetti and Pesenti (2001) and Benigno (2002).
27The neglect of monetary balances reflects the assumption of the cashless limit. This assumption is
important since it contributes to the central feature of the model that any direct monetary spillovers
between countries enter the welfare objective only through the consumption channel.
28Canzoneri et al. compare directly an environment of flexible and sticky output prices (measured in
terms of producer currency prices), while Obstfeld and Rogoff specify the analysis in terms of flexible and
sticky wages. However, with labour being the only production input and constant and identical elasticities
of demand across goods, this different representation is inconsequential.
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sumption risks in tradeable goods, reflecting the separability of utility in tradeable and
non-tradeable goods.29 This feature ensures that the flexible wage solution becomes con-
strained Pareto efficient ex ante. In other words, taking as given the non-monetary distor-
tions of the economy related to monopolistic competition, monetary policy cannot Pareto-
improve upon replicating the flexible wage equilibrium. Assuming ρ = 1, the welfare
objectives faced by the two policymakers have a representation of the form
E(V ) = E(V˜ ) +ω′Ωyω and E(V
∗) = E(V˜ ∗) +ω∗′Ωyω
∗
where E(V˜ ) and E(V˜ ∗) denote the flexible-wage components in the two countries and
where the vector y summarizes the sources of volatility (with associated variance-covariance
matrix Ωy and country-specific weighting vectors ω and ω
∗), which make the sticky wage
economies depart from the flexible wage economies. As stressed by Canzoneri et al (2005),
the vector y, in general, summarizes two distinct effects: i) the effects of the altogether
six sector-specific productivity shocks and ii) the demand effects of monetary policy which
operate not sector-specific, but proportional to aggregate demand in the two countries.
Using the notation εj = log(Ej) and x = (m, m
∗), with m = log(M) and m∗ = log(M∗),
it can be shown that the 6× 1-vector y can be represented as
y = y+Bxx+Bεε,
where y′ = (yN , yD, yE∗ , yN∗ , yD∗ , yE), ε
′ = (εN , εD, εE∗ , εN∗ , εD∗ , εE) and Bx and Bε
denote 6×2 and 6× 6−matrices, respectively.30 Monetary policy actions are restricted to
satisfy
x= r+Rεε.
Within this representation it is easy to see that for arbitrary realizations of ε the two
monetary policymakers do not have sufficient instruments to ensure that in the non-
cooperative game ex-post all entries of y (and, hence, of Ωy) will be set to zero, since
Bx is not invertible. Exploiting this feature, Canzoneri et al. conclude that, despite
assuming ρ = 1, cooperative and non-cooperative behavior of monetary policymaker leads
in general to different outcomes.31 However, as a special case within this representation,
it is straightforward to establish the benchmark irrelevance result of monetary policy
cooperation obtained by Obstfeld and Rogoff if one abstracts from sector-specific shocks
and imposes instead that there only exist two country-specific shocks, i.e. εN = εD =
εE = ε and εN∗ = εD∗ = εE∗ = ε∗ . Ceteris paribus, this ensures that there remain only
two sources of volatility which lead to deviations of the sticky wage economy from the
flexible wage economy. Hence, there exists a representation(
y
y∗
)
=
(
y
y∗
)
+Bx
(
m
m∗
)
+Bε
(
ε
ε∗
)
.
29For a closely related analysis, see Proposition 2 in Clarida et al. (2002, p. 897).
30For this representation to be exact under ρ = 1, it requires that all shocks are log-normally distributed.
Moreover, to preserve consistency with our Section 2.8, notice that, slightly different from the notation in
Canzoneri et al (2005, p. 373), the elements of the vector y do not stand for the logarithms of sectoral
output levels per se, but they rather capture the differences between the logarithms of sectoral output and
productivity levels, i.e., using their notation, they denote yj − zj .
31For this conclusion, see Proposition 3 in Canzoneri et al. (2005, page 376).
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This representation, with the 2 × 2-matrix Bx being invertible, satisfies all the require-
ments for the Corollary to Proposition 4 to apply. In other words, non-cooperative and
cooperative outcomes of monetary policy are identical and the flexible wage solution can
be ex post implemented for arbitrary realizations of ε and ε∗ .
The analytical strength of the Obstfeld-Rogoff framework is reflected by the fact that
clear insights can also be obtained for environments characterized by ρ = 1. Under this
assumption, the availability of sufficiently many stabilization tools (as required for the
implementation of the flexible wage outcome) does no longer suffice to ensure that non-
cooperative (‘self-oriented’) Nash policies coincide with the cooperative outcome. Intu-
itively, the risk-sharing criterion comes in as an additional welfare objective which changes
the trade-offs under cooperative and non-cooperative policies, implying that, in general,
E(V˜ ) and E(V˜ ∗) are no longer independent of x. However, for the special case in which
the country-specific shocks are identical in the two countries (i.e. caused by the same
global shock such that ε = ε∗) this latter concern is no longer relevant. In other words,
assuming ρ = 1, it can be shown that under the particular assumption that all shocks are
only of global nature the irrelevance proposition will be restored.
In sum, adapted to our framework, this reasoning can be summarized as follows:
Obstfeld-Rogoff (2000, 2002) and Canzoneri et al (2005):
Assume there exist direct monetary spillover effects between countries. Then, coalition
structures and commitment patterns between policymakers, in general, are not irrelevant.
However, i) if the flexible wage solution is constrained Pareto efficient ex ante and ii) if
there exist sufficiently many instruments in a linear-quadratic framework to stabilize the
economies at this solution, coalition structures and commitment patterns between policy-
makers become irrelevant.
In order to obtain an irrelevance result along these lines, both criteria need to be satisfied.
As indicated by the discussion of the risk-sharing criterion, often the two criteria cannot
be independently assessed. Because of these features, the related literature typically con-
cludes that the theoretical requirements for a complete absence of gains from cooperation
in second-generations models are very restrictive. This can be seen from the following
and not exhaustive list of variations of the Obstfeld-Rogoff benchmark model, stressing
channels which are different from Canzoneri et al. (2005). For example, Devereux and
Engel (2003) and Corsetti and Pesenti (2005) relax the assumption of producer currency
pricing and re-establish gains from cooperation under different pricing regimes. In par-
ticular, gains from coordination arise for ‘intermediate pricing cases’ in which there is
neither zero nor complete pass-through from exchange rate changes to consumer currency
prices. Benigno and Benigno (2006) drop the assumption of a unit elasticity of substitution
between home and foreign goods and argue that, in general, the terms-of-trade channel
becomes strategically relevant if the intertemporal and intratemporal elasticities of substi-
tution in consumption are different from each other. Moreover, they allow for alternative
types of shocks (like mark-up shocks) and argue that in optimal cooperative outcomes
the exchange rate regime itself might, in fact, be different for different types of shocks.
Like Benigno and Benigno (2006), Sutherland (2004) as well as Lombardo and Sutherland
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(2004) also drop the assumption of a unit elasticity of substitution between home and
foreign goods. Sutherland (2004) finds that gains from cooperation depend significantly
on the assumed asset market structures, in particular with respect to their ability to facil-
itate consumption risk sharing. Lombardo and Sutherland (2004) consider an extension of
the Obstfeld-Rogoff framework in which both monetary and fiscal policies can be used as
stabilization tools and identify conditions under which fiscal cooperation improves welfare,
both under flexible and sticky prices and conditional on the (non)-cooperation between
monetary policies.32
It should be emphasized, however, that despite this range of rather unambiguous theoret-
ical predictions the verdict on the quantitative relevance of spillovers in second-generation
models is still very much open. In particular, Obstfeld and Rogoff (2002, p. 504) argue
that “...our attempts to parameterize our model suggest that even when cooperation is
beneficial in theory, it may be relatively unimportant empirically”. By contrast, Can-
zoneri et al (2005, p. 364) “...conclude - based on theoretical considerations and a first
pass calibration of our model - that second generation models may have more scope for
policy coordination than did the first.”33 It seems safe to conclude that this debate will
not be solved soon, given the inherently complex relationship between policy instruments
and model-specific welfare objectives in second-generations models. At the same time,
this insight points at the importance of tractable benchmark models, as discussed in this
section, which give rise to unambiguous analytical results and which therefore can give
some structure to the quantitative findings from larger models.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we set up a general framework to address the importance of commitment
patterns and cooperation schemes in policy games between various policymakers. We prove
that the nature of spillover effects between agents is of key relevance to answer this issue.
To this end, we offer a simple classification of spillover effects between agents which dis-
tinguishes between within-coalition and between-coalition spillover effects. Based on this
classification, we provide general propositions which prove that under some conditions,
linked to these spillover effects, commitment and cooperation schemes do not matter. In
particular, frameworks with a certain linear-quadratic structure lead to the conclusion
that commitment and cooperation issues are entirely irrelevant. Yet, the conditions which
are responsible for this puzzling result are shown to be rather restrictive and, more im-
portantly, they have no longer any bite in a generic, non-linear-quadratic environment.
Having established the general principles for this classification in the first part of the paper,
we then apply these principles to explain the driving forces behind seemingly contradictory
results from a number of recent contributions on the nature of policy interactions both
within monetary unions and among fully sovereign nations.
32The paper also discusses these findings in a monetary union version of the model, related to the analysis
by Beetsma and Jensen (2005).
33For a more comprehensive discussion of quantitative findings in this context, see Coenen et al. (2007).
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6 Appendix
6.1 Proof of Proposition 1
We consider two-stage games Γ and Γ′, allowing for coalitions among subsets of agents.
It is easy to generalize the proof to games with more stages. Consider first a game Γ. We
partition the set of players into two subsets Ξ1 and Ξ2. Ξ1 (Ξ2) is formed of players making
their decision at stage 1 (2). At each stage, coalitions may be active. There are K (L)
coalitions at stage 1 (2), denoted by Ck (Cl). We denote by C1 (C2) the set of coalitions
formed in stage 1 (2). For a given structure of coalitions, the game is solved by subgame
perfection. An interior SPNE outcome z of the game satisfies the following conditions:
At stage 2,
ωξ
dVξ(z)
dxξ
+
∑
ξ′∈Cl, ξ
′ =ξ
ωξ′
dVξ′(z)
dxξ
= 0, ∀ξ ∈ Cl,∀Cl ∈ C2 (25)
where the first term captures the effect of the action of player ξ on his own welfare, while the
second term describes the direct within-coalition spillover effects on the coalition members
in the coalition Cl. Since stage 2 is the final stage of the game, there are by construction
no indirect within-coalition spillover effects.
At stage 1,
ωξ
∂Vξ(z)
∂xξ
+ ωξ
 ∑
Cl∈C2
∑
ξ
′′
∈Cl
∂Vξ(z)
∂xξ′′
∂xξ′′
∂xξ

+
∑
ξ′∈Ck, ξ
′ =ξ
ωξ′
∂Vξ′(z)
∂xξ
+
∑
ξ′∈Ck, ξ
′ =ξ
ωξ′
∑
Cl∈C2
∑
ξ
′′
∈Cl
∂Vξ′(z)
∂xξ′′
∂xξ′′
∂xξ
= 0, ∀ξ ∈ Ck,∀Ck ∈ C1. (26)
To describe stage 1 interactions, four effects can be distinguished. The first term captures
the direct effect of the action of player ξ on his own welfare, while the second term describes
the indirect effect on his own welfare through actions taken by players in coalitions formed
in the second period. For this second term to be non-zero it is necessary that there exist
direct between-coalition spillover effects between ξ and at least one player ξ′′ acting at stage
2, i.e.
∂Vξ(z)
∂xξ′′
must be non-zero for at least one pair ξ and ξ′′. The third term describes
the direct within-coalition spillover effects of the action xξ on the coalition members in
the coalition Ck. Finally, the fourth term captures the indirect within-coalition spillover
effects on the coalition members in the coalition Ck through actions taken by players in
coalitions formed at stage 2. For this fourth term to be non-zero it is necessary that there
exist direct between-coalition spillover effects between at least one other member of Ck
and at least one player ξ′′ acting at stage 2.
Correspondingly, one can derive the set of conditions applying to Γ′.
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To ensure that (25) and (26) admit the same equilibrium outcome for two games Γ and Γ′,
the set of sufficient conditions summarized in Proposition 1 are derived from the following
two-step procedure. First, to undo the effects of different commitment patterns in Γ and
Γ′, all direct between-coalition spillover effects between players acting at different stages
are required to be zero at z. This requirement ensures that the second and fourth term
discussed in (26) vanish in equilibrium. Second, a condition is needed which addresses the
effects of different coalitions structures in Γ and Γ′. Certainly, a sufficient condition would
be to require that the direct within-coalition spillover effects for all coalitions formed in
Γ and Γ′ vanish at z, implying that (25) and (26) reduce for both games to ωξ
∂Vξ(z)
∂xξ
= 0,
∀ξ ∈ Ξ. Yet, having controlled for possible differences in commitment patterns already in
the first step, (25) and (26) admit for Γ and Γ′ the same equilibrium outcome also under
the weaker condition that the direct within-coalition spillover effects need to vanish at z
only for those coalitions which are formed in Γ′, but not in Γ, and vice versa.
This reasoning can be generalized to games with more than 2 stages, as any h − stage
extensive form game can be restated as a sequence of 2-stage extensive-form games. 
Remark at Proposition 2: If at zNash all direct spillovers between any pair of players
vanish it is clear from (25) and (26) that zNash is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
outcome for any possible extensive-form game characterized by arbitrary commitment
patterns and coalition structures.
6.2 Proof of Proposition 3
Using (1) in (2), we can express Vξ as:
Vξ =
1
2
[ωξ1(y
∗
1 − y1 −
X∑
j=1
b1jxj)
2 + ...+ ωξp(y
∗
p − yp −
X∑
j=1
bpjxj)
2 + ...
+ωξX(y
∗
X − yX −
X∑
j=1
bXjxj)
2]
In general, any Nash equilibrium outcome zNash of the simultaneous Nash game ΓNash
played by the X players satisfies the set of conditions:
∂Vξ(z
Nash)
∂xξ
= 0,∀ξ ∈ Ξ.
Because of the linear-quadratic structure, this set of equations can be expressed as follows:
∂Vξ(z
Nash)
∂xξ
=
X∑
p=1
ωξpbpξ
[
y∗p − yp −
X∑
j=1
bpjxj
]
= 0, ∀ξ ∈ Ξ (27)
The direct spillover effect of ξ′ on agent ξ’s payoff is given by the expression:
∂Vξ(z
Nash)
∂xξ′
=
X∑
p=1
ωξpbpξ′
[
y∗p − yp −
X∑
j=1
bpjxj
]
(28)
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Let zNash = B−1 [y∗ − y] . This vector satisfies (27), as required for a Nash-equilibrium.
Moreover, this solution is unique since it has been assumed that for every p the product
ωξpbxpξ is non-zero for at least one ξ = 1, 2, ...,X. Finally, at z
Nash for any pair (ξ, ξ′)
equation (28) is zero. Hence, the linear-quadratic case satisfies Proposition 2. 
6.3 Proof of Proposition 4
The proof is analogous to the proof of Proposition 3. Combine (3) and (4) and define
M = (BxRε +Bε) to obtain
y∗ − y = y∗ − y−Bxr− (BxRε +Bε)ε = y
∗ − y−Bxr−Mε
Use this equation in (5) to obtain for player ξ
E(Vξ) =
1
2
E
 X∑
p=1
ωξp
[
y∗p − yp −
X∑
j=1
bxpjrj −
S∑
s=1
mpsεs
]2 , (29)
where bxpj and mps denote representative entries of the X × X−matrix Bx and of the
X×S−matrixM, respectively. Any Nash equilibrium outcome RNash= [rNash,RNash
ε
] of
the simultaneous Nash game ΓNash played by the X players satisfies the set of conditions
∂E[Vξ(R
Nash)]
∂rξ
= 0, ∀ξ ∈ Ξ.
∂E[Vξ(R
Nash)]
∂rεξs
= 0, ∀s = 1, 2, ..., S, and ∀ξ ∈ Ξ,
where rξ and r
ε
ξs are representative entries of the X × 1−vector r and the X × S−matrix
Rε, respectively. Because of the linear-quadratic structure, this set of equations can be
expressed as follows:
∂E[Vξ(R
Nash)]
∂rξ
= E
[
X∑
p=1
ωξpb
x
pξ
[
y∗p − yp
]]
= 0,∀ξ ∈ Ξ. (30)
∂E[Vξ(R
Nash)]
∂rεξs
= E
[
X∑
p=1
ωξp
∂mps
∂rεξs
εs
[
y∗p − yp
]]
= 0,∀s = 1, 2, ..., S, and ∀ξ ∈ Ξ(31)
The direct spillover effects of ξ′ on agent ξ’s expected payoffs are given by the expressions:
∂E[Vξ(R
Nash)]
∂rξ′
= E
[
X∑
p=1
ωξpb
x
pξ′
[
y∗p − yp
]]
= 0 (32)
∂E[Vξ(R
Nash)]
∂rε
ξ′s
= E
[
X∑
p=1
ωξp
∂mps
∂rε
ξ′s
εs
[
y∗p − yp
]]
= 0,∀s = 1, 2, ..., S. (33)
Let RNash= [rNash,RNashε ], with r
Nash = B−1x (y
∗−y) and RNash
ε
= −B−1x ·Bε, implying
y∗ = y. Hence, RNash satisfies (30) and (31), as required for a Nash-equilibrium. More-
over, this solution is unique since it has been assumed that for every p the product ωξpbpξ is
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non-zero for at least one ξ = 1, 2, ..., X. Finally, at RNash for any pair (ξ, ξ′) equations (32)
and (33) are zero. Hence, this stochastic extension of the linear-quadratic case satisfies
Proposition 2. 
Proof of the Corollary to Proposition 4 :
Notice that (29) can be alternatively expressed as
E(Vξ) = V
Det
ξ −
1
2
E
[
X∑
p=1
ωξp
[
S∑
s=1
mpsεs
]2]
= V Detξ −
1
2
X∑
p=1
ωξpV ar(yp),
where V Detξ denotes a deterministic component. Based on this decomposition consider
now the extended problem (which ignores, for simplicity, all constant terms) of the form
E(Vξ) = E
[
X∑
p=1
X∑
q=1
ωξpq
[
S∑
s=1
mpsεs
][
S∑
s=1
mqsεs
]]
=
X∑
p=1
X∑
q=1
ωξpqCov(yp, yq), (34)
where the indices of the ω-terms have been extended to account for the additional co-
variance terms. Because of the additively multiplicative structure within (34) it is clear
that M = 0, as implied by RNashε = −B
−1
x ·Bε, i) satisfies the set of first-order conditions
characterizing the simultaneous Nash game ΓNash and ii) ensures that all direct spillovers
between all pairs of players vanish at RNashε . 
6.4 The model of Dixit and Lambertini: a special case of Proposition 3
The representation of the model of Dixit and Lambertini described in Section 3.3 can be
rewritten as follows such that it satisfies (1) and (2). First, define the inflation forecast
error such that πfe ≡ π−πe. Then, introduce a new vector y˜ = (πfe,y,π), with y˜ relating
to the states of the three groups of agents: single private sector actor, country-specific
fiscal policymakers, single monetary policymaker. Since
πfe = π − πe
yi = yi +
n∑
k=1
bikτk + bi(π − π
e)
π = π,
y˜ can be linearly linked to the instruments x = (πe, τ , π) in line with (1), i.e.
y˜ = y˜+ B˜x,
with y˜ = (0,y,0). Moreover, the target value of the inflation forecast error satisfies πfe
∗
=
0. Hence, the payoff functions of all three types of (non-cooperative) players
U =
1
2
(πfe
∗
− πfe)2 =
1
2
(π − πe)2
Vi =
1
2
[
ωi(y
∗
i − yi)
2 + (π
∗
− π)2
]
=
1
2
[
ωi(y
∗
i − yi)
2 + π2
]
VM =
n∑
i=1
ωMi Vi =
1
2
[
n∑
i=1
[
ωMi ωi(y
∗
i − yi)
2
]
+ π2
]
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are in line with (2). 
6.5 The model of Chari and Kehoe: main results
Consider first the four games CK1 - CK4 studied by Chari and Kehoe and summarized in
the main text, with:
1. Game CK1 under CI (no fiscal cooperation, monetary policy moves last):
i/ τ i (non-cooperatively), ii/ aij (non-cooperatively), iii/ π.
2. Game CK2 under CI (fiscal cooperation, monetary policy moves last):
i/ τ i (cooperatively), ii/ aij (non-cooperatively), iii/ π.
3. Game CK3 under CII (no fiscal cooperation, monetary policy moves first):
i/ π, ii/ τ i (non-cooperatively), iii/ aij (non-cooperatively).
4. Game CK4 under CII (fiscal cooperation, monetary policy moves first):
i/ π, ii/ τ i (cooperatively), iii/ aij (non-cooperatively).
Let zg = (a, τ , π), g = 1, 2, 3, 4 denote the solution vectors of the four games. For simplicity
(and without loss of generality), let ωij = ω
F
i = ω
M
i = 1.
I) Comparison of CK1 and CK2 under CI
Consider CK1:
Stage 3 gives rise to the first-order condition
∂VM(z1)
∂π
=
∂
[
n∑
i=1
∑
j∈Mi
Uij(z1)
]
∂π
= 0, (35)
leading (at least implicitly) to a solution for π such that π = π(a, τ ).
Stage 2 gives rise to a system of first-order conditions, with
∂Uij(z1)
∂aij
+
∂Uij(z1)
∂π
∂π
∂aij
= 0 (36)
to be calculated for all i and all j, leading to a solution a = a(τ ).
Stage 1 simplifies if one combines the preceding steps to obtain π = π(a(τ ), τ ). Then,
stage 1 gives rise to a system of first-order conditions, with
∂Vi(z1)
∂τ i
=
∑
j∈Mi
[
∂Uij(z1)
∂τ i
+
∂Uij(z1)
∂π
∂π
∂τ i
+
(
∂Uij(z1)
∂aij
+
∂Uij(z1)
∂π
∂π
∂aij
)
∂aij
∂τ i
]
(37)
+
∑
j∈Mi
 ∑
k∈Mi,k =j
(
∂Uij(z1)
∂aik
+
∂Uij(z1)
∂π
∂π
∂aik
)
∂aik
∂τ i

= 0
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to be calculated for all i.
These first-order conditions can be further simplified by using stepwise the envelope the-
orem. Notice that a symmetric equilibrium across all countries and players (with aij = a
∀i, j and τ i = τ ∀i) requires
∂Uij(z1)
∂π
= 0 in (35). Hence, (36) simplifies to
∂Uij(z1)
∂aij
= 0 and
(37) simplifies to
∂Vi(z1)
∂τ i
=
∑
j∈Mi
∂Uij(z1)
∂τ i
+
∑
j∈Mi
∑
k∈Mi,k =j
∂Uij(z1)
∂aik
∂aik
∂τ i
= 0 (38)
Two elements are crucial for the understanding of CK1: i) Since the common monetary
policy moves last, this makes private sector actions in stage 2 depend on the entire vector
of fiscal actions τ . ii) The non-cooperative behavior of private agents within countries
creates indirect fiscal spillovers which become relevant at stage 1 and which depend on the
particular commitment pattern CI . Under the assumption of non-cooperative fiscal policy
in CK1, these spillovers are not internalized.
Consider CK2: By backward induction, stage 3 and 2 are identical to CK1. Stage 1,
because of fiscal cooperation between countries, gives rise to a different first-order condition
∂Vi(z2)
∂τ i
+
n∑
l=1, l =i
∂Vl(z2)
∂τ i
= 0,
implying ∑
j∈Mi
[
∂Uij(z1)
∂τ i
+
∂Uij(z1)
∂π
∂π
∂τ i
+
(
∂Uij(z1)
∂aij
+
∂Uij(z1)
∂π
∂π
∂aij
)
∂aij
∂τ i
]
(39)
+
∑
j∈Mi
∑
k∈Mi,k =j
(
∂Uij(z1)
∂aik
+
∂Uij(z1)
∂π
∂π
∂aik
)
∂aik
∂τ i
+
n∑
l=1, l=i
∑
j∈Ml
[
∂Ulj(z2)
∂π
∂π
∂τ i
+
(
∂Ulj(z2)
∂alj
+
∂Ulj(z2)
∂π
∂π
∂alj
)
∂alj
∂τ i
]
+
n∑
l=1, l=i
∑
j∈Ml
∑
k∈Ml,k =j
(
∂Ulj(z2)
∂alk
+
∂Ulj(z2)
∂π
∂π
∂alk
)
∂alk
∂τ i
= 0
Consider again a symmetric equilibrium, implying
∂Uij(z2)
∂π =
∂Ulj(z2)
∂π = 0 and
∂Uij(z2)
∂aij
=
∂Ulj(z2)
∂alj
= 0. Then, (39) simplifies to
∂Vi(z2)
∂τ i
+
n∑
l=1, l =i
∂Vl(z2)
∂τ i
=
∑
j∈Mi
∂Uij(z2)
∂τ i
+
n∑
l=1
∑
j∈Ml
∑
k∈Ml,k =j
∂Ulj(z2)
∂alk
∂alk
∂τ i
= 0, (40)
i.e. the indirect fiscal spillover effects are internalized. Hence, by comparing (38) and (40)
one infers that the SPNE of CK 1 and CK 2 are generically different.
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II) Comparison of CK3 and CK4 under CII
Consider CK 3. By backward induction, stage 3 gives rise to a system of first-order
conditions
∂Uij(z3)
∂aij
= 0, leading to a solution ai = ai(τ i, π). Stage 2 gives rise to a system
of first-order conditions
∑
j∈Mi
∂Uij(z3)
∂τ i
+
∂Uij(z3)
∂aij
∂aij
∂τ i
+
∑
k∈Mi,k =j
∂Uij(z3)
∂aik
∂aik
∂τ i
 = 0, (41)
leading to a solution for τ i such that τ i = τ i(π). Stage 1, using ai = ai(τ i(π), π), gives
rise to a first-order condition
n∑
i=1
∑
j∈Mi
∂Uij(z3)
∂π
+
∂Uij(z3)
∂aij
∂aij
∂π
+
∑
k∈Mi,k =j
∂Uij(z3)
∂aik
∂aik
∂π
+
n∑
i=1
∑
j∈Mi
∂Uij(z3)
∂τ i
+
∂Uij(z3)
∂aij
∂aij
∂τ i
+
∑
k∈Mi,k =j
∂Uij(z3)
∂aik
∂aik
∂τ i
 ∂τ i
∂π
= 0 (42)
These first-order conditions can be simplified by using stepwise the envelope theorem.
Using
∂Uij(z3)
∂aij
= 0, (41) reduces to
∑
j∈Mi
∂Uij(z3)
∂τ i
+
∑
k∈Mi,k =j
∂Uij(z3)
∂aik
∂aik
∂τ i
 = 0,
while (42) reduces to
n∑
i=1
∑
j∈Mi
∂Uij(z3)
∂π
+
∑
k∈Mi,k =j
∂Uij(z3)
∂aik
∂aik
∂π
 = 0
Consider CK 4: By backward induction, the solution of CK 4 satisfies the same first-order
conditions as CK 3, since the solution of stage 3, namely ai = ai(τ i, π), implies that there
are no indirect fiscal spillover effects between fiscal players at stage 2.
III) Irrelevance of fiscal cooperation under all other commitment patterns
There are four more commitment patterns CIII − CV I :
CIII : i/ π, ii/ aij(non-cooperatively), iii/ τ i (cooperatively or non-cooperatively).
CIV : i/ aij(non-cooperatively), ii/ π, iii/ τ i (cooperatively or non-cooperatively).
By backward induction, under CIII and CIV fiscal cooperation evidently is irrelevant,
CV : i/ aij(non-cooperatively), ii/ τ i (cooperatively or non-cooperatively), iii/ π.
To see that fiscal cooperation is irrelevant, consider the two stage-game:
C′ : i/ aij(non-cooperatively), ii/ τ i (non-cooperatively), π.
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Notice that under C′ there are no direct spillovers between the players of the Nash game
of stage ii). Hence, applying Proposition 2 to this subgame, fiscal cooperation is irrelevant
under CV .
CV I : i/ τ i (cooperatively or non-cooperatively), ii/ π, iii/ aij(non-cooperatively):
Fiscal cooperation is irrelevant, since, differently from CI , private agents take π as given,
i.e. direct private spillovers within countries cannot generate indirect fiscal spillovers
between countries. 
6.6 Canzoneri and Henderson (1988, 1991) and Rogoff (1985): main
results
This appendix summarizes how the comparison of payoffs under cooperative and non-
cooperative behavior in (23) and (24) has been derived, using:
E[Vi] =
1
2
E
[
ω(y∗ − yi)
2 + (πCPIi )
2
]
πCPI1 = π1 + (1− β)er = π1 + (1− β)(en + π2 − π1)
πCPI2 = π2 − (1− β)er = π2 − (1− β)(en + π2 − π1)
y∗ − y1 = y
∗ − y − bπ(π1 − π
e
1) + be(er − e
e
r)− ε
= y∗ − y − bπ(π1 − π
e
1) + be(en + π2 − π1 − e
e
r)− ε
y∗ − y2 = y
∗ − y − bπ(π2 − π
e
2)− be(er − e
e
r)− ε
= y∗ − y − bπ(π2 − π
e
2)− be(en + π2 − π1 − e
e
r)− ε.
Let country 1 be the representative country.
Non-cooperation:
Policymaker 1 maximizes his payoff over π1 after ε has been observed, taking as given π2
and private sector expectations, leading to the first-order condition
−ω [y∗ − y − bπ(π1 − π
e
1) + be(er − e
e
r)− ε] (bπ + be) + [π1 + (1− β)er]β = 0
Private agents, anticipating this reaction, form rational expectations, where we exploit
eer = er = 0. Hence, in any symmetric equilibrium
πe,nc1 = π
e,nc
2 = π
e,nc =
ω
β
(bπ + be)(y
∗ − y).
Using this expression within the first-order condition one obtains
πnc =
ω
β
(bπ + be)(y
∗ − y)− ω
bπ + be
ωbπ(bπ + be) + β
ε
y∗ − ync = y∗ − y −
β
ωbπ(bπ + be) + β
ε,
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which leads to
E[V nc] =
1
2
[
ω
[
1 + ω(
bπ + be
β
)2
]
(y∗ − y)2 + ω
β2 + ω(bπ + be)
2
[ωbπ(bπ + be) + β]
2σ
2
ε
]
φncy∗ = ω
[
1 + ω(
bπ + be
β
)2
]
, φncε = ω
β2 + ω(bπ + be)
2
[ωbπ(bπ + be) + β]
2
E[Unc] =
1
2
ψncε σ
2
ε =
1
2
[
ω
bπ + be
ωbπ(bπ + be) + β
]2
σ2ε.
Cooperation:
Policymakers 1 and 2 jointly maximize the sum of their payoffs over π1 and π2 after ε has
been observed, taking as given private sector expectations, leading to the (representative)
first-order condition of policymaker 1:
0 = −ω [y∗ − y − bπ(π1 − π
e
1) + be(er − e
e
r)− ε] (bπ + be) + [π1 + (1− β)er]β
+ω [y∗ − y − bπ(π2 − π
e
2)− be(er − e
e
r)− ε] be + [π2 − (1− β)er] (1− β)
Private agents, anticipating this reaction, form rational expectations, where we exploit
eer = er = 0. Hence, in any symmetric equilibrium
πe,c1 = π
e,c
2 = π
e,c = ωbπ(y
∗ − y)
πc = ωbπ(y
∗ − y)− ω
bπ
1 + ωb2
π
ε
y∗ − yc = y∗ − y −
1
1 + ωb2
π
ε,
implying
E[V c] =
1
2
[
ω
[
1 + ωb2π
]
(y∗ − y)2 + ω
1
1 + ωb2π
σ2ε
]
φcy∗ = ω
[
1 + ωb2π
]
, φcε = ω
1
1 + ωb2π
E[Uc] =
1
2
ψcεσ
2
ε =
1
2
[
ωbπ
1 + ωb2π
]2
σ2ε.
Comparison of cooperation vs. non-cooperation:
Comparing coefficients, one obtains (i) φncε −φ
c
ε > 0 if [(1− β)bπ + be]
2 > 0, (ii) φncy∗−φ
c
y∗ <
0 if b2π > (
bπ+be
β
)2, and (iii) ψncε −ψ
c
ε < 0 if (
β
ω(bπ+be)
+bπ)
2 > ( 1
ωbπ
+bπ)
2. Notice that (i) will
always be satisfied. By assumption bπ > 0, be < 0, β ∈ (0, 1). Assume 0 < bπ + be < βbπ.
Then, (ii) and (iii) will also be satisfied. Hence, for the logic of Rogoff to obtain, there
exists, for any given direct output effect of inflation (bπ) a certain trade-off between the
real exchange rate effect of inflation (be) and the the openness of the economy (β).
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